

than the actual operation. "On July 1," he wrote, "the Russian revolutionary army, with tremendous enthusiasm, launched the offensive. Disregarding the small groups of cowards in some regiments and leaving them with contempt in the rear, the free warriors of Russia have affirmed by their offensive the new discipline based on the sense of civic duty. This day has put an end to vicious insinuations against the democratic organizations of the Russian army. . . ."

From the very beginning, however, there had been much confusion. Whole regiments disobeyed the order to charge or obeyed only after long hesitation. On the third day, a grenadier regiment, ordered to advance, decided to take no part in the imperialistic war, left its positions, and marched to the rear, opening a wide gap in the front lines. The High Command and the army organizations had to send reserve units to encircle and disarm the rebels.

Some regiments suffered heavy losses, especially among committeemen who went at the head of attacking forces. Other units advanced only until they met opposition. Some few returned to their initial positions after an irresolute push forward. Fortunately, the morale of the Austrian troops in this sector was no better than ours. Some Austrian divisions began to retreat before the Russians approached their positions, and the Austrian Command was compelled to regroup its forces by withdrawing units that had not been attacked. Thus the Eighth Army, under the command of General Kornilov, crossed the Austro-Russian border, and, almost unopposed, continued to advance, taking one city after another.

Then the German High Command shifted some of its crack troops to the Eastern Front. On July 19 they launched a general counter-offensive—not against the advanced units of the Eighth Army, but further south, against the famous "Regiments of July 1," which had not advanced since the initial attack. The front of the Eleventh Army was pierced at several points and our command began to pull back divisions that the Germans had not yet attacked. The retreat of the Eleventh Army exposed the left flank of the Seventh Army, which likewise fell back. Confusion on the front increased from hour to hour. By July 23 the retreat became a disorderly rout. Entire divisions left the line, abandoning their equipment and opening the way for the enemy's advance.

In this desperate situation, the Russian High Command in Mogilev ordered the Fifth Army, on the Northern Front, to advance. The commander of the army had advised against this operation, considering it hopeless, but the command at Mogilev overruled his objections. The Fifth Army started the operation but was beaten back. Then the High Command ordered the Eighth Army to fall back, and it returned to its initial position. After less than four weeks the whole operation